The variability of renewable energy and transmission congestion provide opportunities for arbitrage by merchants in deregulated electricity markets. Merchants strategically invest to maximize their profits. This paper proposes a joint investment framework for renewable energy, transmission lines, and energy storage using the Stackelberg game model. At the upper level, merchants implement investment and operation strategies for deregulated transmission and energy storage to maximize profits. At the middle level, central planners seek to maximize social welfare through investments in centralized renewable energy and energy storage. At the lower level, independent system operators jointly optimize the energy and reserve markets to minimize the total operating costs. Merchants are remunerated through financial rights, which are a settlement method based on locational marginal price. The trilevel optimization problem is reformulated as a tractable single-level one using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and strong duality theory. The interaction between merchants and central planners is studied with an example based on the IEEE 30-bus test system. The assignment of weight coefficients to the corresponding stochastic scenarios can help merchants avoid investment risk, and their effectiveness is verified with the IEEE 118-bus test system.